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Abstract
Dramatic increases in the capabilities and decreases in the costs of
computers and communication networks have fomented revolutionary
thoughts in the scholarly publishing community. In one dimension,
traditional pricing schemes and product packages are being modiﬁed
or replaced. We designed and undertook a large-scale ﬁeld experi-
ment in pricing and bundling for electronic access to scholarly jour-
nals: PEAK. We provided Internet-based delivery of content from
1200 Elsevier Science journals to users at multiple campuses and com-
mercial facilities. Our primary research objective was to generate rich
empirical evidence on user behavior when faced with various bundling
schemes and price structures. In this article we explain the diﬀerent
types and levels of cost that users faced when accessing individual ar-
ticles, and report on the eﬀect of these costs on usage. We found that
both monetary and non-monetary user costs have a signiﬁcant impact
on the demand for electronic access. We also estimate how taking user
costs into account would change the “optimal” (least cost) bundle of
access options that an institution should purchase.
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11 Introduction
Electronic access to scholarly journals has become an important and com-
monly accepted tool for researchers. The user community has become more
familiar with the medium over time and has started to actively bid for alter-
native forms of access. Technological improvements in communication net-
works, paired with decreasing costs of hardware, create greater incentives for
innovation. Consequently, although publishers and libraries face a number
of challenges, they also have promising new opportunities.1 Publishers are
creating many new electronic-only journals on the Internet, while also devel-
oping and deploying electronic access to literature traditionally distributed
on paper. They are modifying traditional pricing schemes and content bun-
dles, and creating new schemes to take advantage of the characteristics of
digital duplication and distribution.
The University of Michigan operated a ﬁeld trial in electronic access pric-
ing and bundling called “Pricing Electronic Access to Knowledge” (PEAK).
We provided a host service consisting of roughly four and a half years of
content (January 1995 – August 1999) of all approximately 1200 Elsevier
Science scholarly journals. Participating institutions had access to this con-
tent for over 18 months.2 Michigan provided Internet-based delivery to over
340,000 authorized users at twelve campuses and commercial research fa-
cilities across the U.S. The full content of the 1200 journals was received,
catalogued and indexed, and delivered in real time. At the end of the project
the database contained 849,371 articles, and of these 111,983 had been ac-
cessed at least once. Over $500,000 in electronic commerce was transacted
during the experiment. Further details of the scope of this project, including
the resources needed for implementation, can be found in Price-Wilkin and
Lougee (2001) [8].
We have elsewhere described the design and goals of the PEAK research
project (MacKie-Mason and Riveros (1999) [6]. In MacKie-Mason, Riveros
and Gazzale (2000) [7], we detailed the pricing schemes oﬀered to institu-
tions and individual users. We also reported and analyzed usage statistics,
including some data on the economic response of institutions and individuals
to the diﬀerent price and access options.
1See MacKie-Mason and Riveros (1999) [6] for a discussion of the economics of elec-
tronic publishing.
2Accounts of the genesis of this project can be found in Price-Wilkin and Lougee
(2001) [8] and Hunter (2001) [2].
2In this paper, we focus on an important economic behavior question: how
much does usage respond to various diﬀerences in user cost? We pay careful
attention to the eﬀect of both pecuniary costs and non-pecuniary costs such
as time and inconvenience.
An interesting aspect of the PEAK project is the role of the library as
economic intermediary and the eﬀects of its decisions on the costs faced
by end users.3 In the ﬁrst stage of the decision process, the library makes
access product purchasing decisions. These decisions then have a potentially
large eﬀect on the costs that users face to access particular electronic journal
articles, whether it be the requirement that users obtain and use a password
or pay a monetary cost. The consumer then decides whether she will pay
these costs to access a given article.
Standard economic theory tells us that a user will access that article if
the marginal beneﬁt that the user obtains from the article (i.e. the value)
is greater than the marginal cost. Diﬀerent users are going to have diﬀer-
ent valuations for electronic access to journal articles. Furthermore, even
the same user will not value all requested articles the same. Information
regarding the users “price” elasticity is thus of import to the institutional
decision-maker in attempting to maximize user welfare subject to a budget
constraint that is increasingly binding. It is therefore vital that institutions
have as much information as possible about the degree to which increased
marginal costs decrease the demand for electronic access. Similarly, demand
elasticity information is vital to ﬁrms designing pricing schemes as system
design decisions will aﬀect non-pecuniary costs faced by the users, and thus
overall demand for access.
It is well known that the usage of information resources responds to the
monetary cost users bear. We ﬁnd that even modest per article fees dras-
tically suppressed usage. It is also true, but perhaps less appreciated, that
non-pecuniary costs are important for the design of digital information ac-
cess systems. We ﬁnd that the number of screens users must navigate, and
the amount of external information they must recall and provide (such as
passwords), has a substantial impact on usage. We estimate the amount of
demand that is choked-oﬀ with successive increases in the marginal cost of
access. Further, we ﬁnd preliminary evidence that users are more likely to
bear these costs when they are expected. Finally, we estimate an institu-
tion’s “optimal” (i.e. lowest cost) bundle, accounting for the fact that the
3Kingma (2001) [5] provides a further treatment of the role of library as intermediary.
3imposition of user costs for access biases actual demand towards lower cost
access.
2 Access Models Oﬀered
The decision of which access products to oﬀer PEAK participants, as well as
their prices, was motivated by many ends. These include the desire to study
innovative access options, the desire to generate a rich dataset of agents
responding to diﬀering costs, as well the need to entice institutions to partic-
ipate. Hunter (2001) [2] gives a fuller account of these deliberations. In the
end, participating institutions in the PEAK experiment were oﬀered packages
containing two or more of the following three access products:
1. Traditional Subscription: Unlimited access to the material available in
the corresponding print journal.
2. Generalized Subscription: Unlimited access to any 120 articles from the
entire database of priced content, typically the two most current years.
Articles are selected on demand, after they are published, as users
request articles that are not otherwise paid for, until the subscription
is exhausted.4 Articles selected for Generalized Subscriptions may be
accessed by all authorized users at that institution.
3. Per Article: Unlimited access for a single individual to a speciﬁc article.
If an article is not available in a subscribed journal, nor a Generalized
Subscription, nor are there unused Generalized Subscription tokens,
then an individual may purchase access to the article.
The per article and Generalized Subscription options allow users to cap-
ture value from the entire corpus of articles, without having to subscribe
to all journal titles. Once the content is created and added to the server
database, the incremental cost of delivery is approximately zero. Therefore,
to create maximal value from the content, it is important that as many users
as possible have access. The design of the pricing and bundling schemes aﬀect
both how much value is delivered from the content (the number of readers)
and how that value is shared between the users and the publisher.
4120 is the approximate average number of articles in a traditional printed journal for
a given year. We refer to this bundle of option to access articles as a set of tokens, with
one token used for each article added to the Generalized Subscription during the year.
4Institution ID Group Traditional Generalized Per Article
5, 6, 7, 8 Green X X
3, 9, 10, 11, 12 Red X X X
13, 14, 15 Blue X X
Table 1: Access Models
Generalized Subscriptions may be thought of as a way to pre-pay (at a
discount) for interlibrary loan requests. One advantage of Generalized Sub-
scription purchases is that the “tokens” cost substantially less per article
than the per article license price. Institutions did, however, need to pur-
chase tokens at the beginning of a year and thus bear some risk. There is
an additional beneﬁt: unlike an interlibrary loan, all users in the commu-
nity have ongoing unlimited access to the articles obtained via Generalized
Subscription token. To the publisher, Generalized Subscriptions represent a
committed ﬂow of revenue at the beginning of each year, and thus shift some
of the risk to the users. Another beneﬁt to the publisher, as noted by Hunter
(2001) [2], is that that they open up access to the entire body of content to all
users. Generalized Subscriptions thus oﬀer one method for the publisher to
increase user value from the already produced content, and thus provide an
opportunity to obtain greater returns from the publication of that content.
Participating institutions were assigned randomly to one of three diﬀer-
ent experimental treatments, which we labeled as the Red, Green and Blue
groups. Institutions in every group could purchase articles on a per article
basis. Those is the Green group could purchase Generalized Subscriptions,
while those in the Blue group could purchase Traditional Subscriptions. In-
stitutions in the Red group could purchase all types of access. Twelve insti-
tutions participated in PEAK: large research universities, medium and small
colleges and professional schools, and corporate libraries. Table 2 shows the
distribution of access models and products oﬀered to the participating insti-
tutions.
3 Summary of User Costs
The PEAK experiment was designed to assess the response to various pricing
and access schemes for digital collections. Since the content was traditional
refereed scholarly literature, the experiment was designed in the context of
5the larger environment and institutions that have developed for scholarly
communication. In particular, PEAK implemented access through the tra-
ditional intermediary: the research library.
The role of the research library aﬀected the design of the experiment
and thus the research questions we could investigate. As previously noted,
the research librarian, by means of the combination of access products he
selects, determines the costs faced by individual users. The individual users
then make article-level access decisions.
When confronted with the PEAK access options and prices, nearly all
of the participating libraries purchased substantial access on behalf of their
users. Once consequence of these institution-level choices is that relatively
few users were faced with the decision of whether or not to purchase addi-
tional access. Although we measured over 200,000 unique individual uses
of the system, we estimate that a user was asked to pay a cost higher than
password-entry only in approximately 1200 instances. As a consequence, it
is important that we try to learn from user response to non-pecuniary as well
as pecuniary costs.
Zero User Cost Access
Substantial amounts of PEAK content were available at zero user cost, merely
by an IP authentication that was automatically performed. That is, when
a user requested content of this type, it was displayed with no additional
hindrance to the user if her workstation’s IP address was associated with a
participating institution.5 Content available at zero user cost included:
• all “unmetered” content, which included articles published at least two
calendar years prior as well as all non-full-length articles;
• articles in journals to which the institution purchased an electronic
Traditional Subscription; and
• articles which had previously been purchased by a user at the institu-
tion with a Generalized Subscription token.
5To access PEAK from other IP addresses, a user must enter a password. Once access
is granted, all content in these categories is available without further user cost.
6Medium User Cost Access
The next level of user cost was the need to enter a password. The transactions
cost of password entry would have ranged from small to substantial. In the
worst case, the user needed to navigate elsewhere in the system to ﬁll out
a form requesting a password, and then wait to receive it via e-mail. Once
received, the user had to enter the password. If the user already had a
password, then the only cost to him is to ﬁnd or recall his password and
enter it. Content accessible via password entry included:
• articles in journals to which the institution does not have a Tradi-
tional Subscription, assuming that the institution has Generalized To-
kens available;
• subsequent access to an article which an individual has already pur-
chased on a per-article basis.
High User Cost Access
If the institution did not have any unused Generalized Subscription tokens,
then content not available at zero cost could be access by payment of a $7
per-article fee. The user who wished to pay the per-article fee would also
bear two non-pecuniary costs: (1) password recall and entry, as above for
the use of a Generalized Subscription token, and (2) credit card recall and
entry.6 In many cases, institutions subsidized, either directly or indirectly,
the per-article fee. Although subsidized, access of this type still resulted in
higher transactions costs. In the indirect subsidy case, a user would need
to submit for reimbursement. In the direct case, except at institution 15,
users needed to arrange for the request to be handled by the institutions
inter-library loan department.
Exceptions
Institutions 13 and 14 were exceptions to many of these rules. At both,
per-article access for all requests was paid (invisibly to the user) by the
6In the ﬁrst eight months of the experiment, users paid with a First Virtual VPIN
account, rather than with a credit card. Because a VPIN was an unfamiliar product, the
non-pecuniary costs were probably higher than for credit card usage, although formally
the user needed to undertake the same steps.
7institution, so users never faced a pecuniary cost. At institution 14, a user
still faced the non-pecuniary cost of ﬁnding her password and entering it for
appropriate “paid”7 content. However, all users at institution 13 accessing
from associated IP addresses were considered password authenticated. Thus
users at institution 13 could access all PEAK content at zero total (pecuniary
and non-pecuniary) cost. We use the diﬀerences in user cost between these
two institutions and the others in the analysis below.
4 Eﬀects of User Cost on Access
In this section, we measure the extent to which user costs to access PEAK
content aﬀected the quantity and composition of articles accessed through
PEAK. Clearly the costs and beneﬁts of accessing the same information
via other means, particularly via an institution’s print journal holdings, will
have an enormous impact on a user’s willingness to bear costs associated with
PEAK access. We do not explicitly model these costs, although we do control
for them at an institutional level. Kingma (2001) [5] provides and overview
and estimation of certain costs associated with the access to information via
non-electronic media.
As noted above, costs required to access PEAK content depended on a
variety of factors. One factor is the type of content requested (“metered”
versus “unmetered”). Looking only at metered content, the costs associated
with access depended in large part on the access products purchased by a
user’s institution. Further, even looking at costs faced by users within the
same institution, access costs depended not only on the speciﬁc products
selected by an institution (i.e. the speciﬁc journals to which an institution
holds a Traditional Subscription; the number of Generalized Tokens pur-
chased), but also on the actions of other users at the institution (whether a
token was previously used to purchase a requested article; how many tokens
are remaining). In the following sections, we estimate the eﬀects of these
marginal costs on the quantity and composition of metered access.
7Paid content is metered content not including article in journals to which an institution
purchased a Traditional Subscription.
84.1 Eﬀects of User Cost on Access by Experimental
Group
To gauge the impact of user cost of usage on aggregate institutional access,
we compared the access patterns of institutions in the Red group with those
in the Blue group. Red institutions had both Generalized and Traditional
Subscriptions available; Blue had only Traditional. In particular, we looked
at the number of “paid” accesses to individual articles (paid by Generalized
tokens or per article fee) per 100 unmetered accesses, normalized to account
for the number of Traditional Subscriptions.8
Institution Group Normalized Paid Accesses










Table 2: Normalized Paid Access per 100 Unmetered Accesses, by Institution
Table 2 presents our statistic for relative demand for paid access: cal-
culated Normalized Paid Access per 100 Unmetered Accesses. Even after
controlling for the size of an institution’s subscription base, demand diﬀered
among institutions with the same access products. This suggests that there
are institution-speciﬁc attributes aﬀecting demand for paid access. It is also
possible that our controlling for subscription size is not complete. One possi-
8Our statistic, which we shall refer to as Normalized Paid Access, is equal to
Apaid
Aunmeter ·
(Scale), where Apaid is the total number of paid accesses, Aunmeter the total number
of unmetered accesses, and Scale is equal total number of free accesses divided by the
total number of accesses to free content in journals to which the institution does not have
a Traditional Subscription. We multiply by Scale due to the fact that the more that
accesses that are covered by Traditional Subscriptions, the less likely a user is to require
paid access. Scaling by access to unmetered content also controls for diﬀerent overall
usage intensity (due to diﬀerent numbers of active users, diﬀerences in the composition of
users, diﬀerences in research orientation, diﬀerences in user education about PEAK, etc.).
Unmetered accesses proxies for the number of user sessions, and therefore our statistic is
an estimate of paid accesses per session.
9bility is that the number of Traditional Subscriptions aﬀects the cost a user
expects to have to pay for an article before the actual cost is realized. Users
at an institution with a large Traditional Subscription base, such as institu-
tion 3, would have had a lower expected marginal cost for access as a large
percentage of the articles are accessible at zero cost. Some users at these in-
stitutions might attempt to access articles via PEAK, expecting them to be
free, while not willing to pay the password cost when the need arises. Thus
the diﬀerence between expected marginal cost and actual marginal cost may
be important. We shall return to this point later.
We can make some interesting comparisons between the Red group and
the institutions in the Blue group. While institution number 13, as a mem-
ber of the Blue group, only had Traditional Subscriptions and per article
access available, users at this institution did not need to authenticate for any
content, and thus faced no marginal cost in accessing paid content. Most
users at Red institutions faced the cost of authenticating to spend a token.9
We would therefore expect a higher rate of paid access at institution 13, and
this is in fact the case.
Paid access at institution 14 was similarly subsidized by the institution.
However, in contrast to institution 13, authentication was required. As the
marginal cost of paid access for institution 14 is exactly the same as those
institutions in the Red group, we would therefore expect that their demand
for paid access would be similar. This is in fact the case. Finally, per article
access for users at institution 15 was not automatically subsidized. Thus,
users faced very high marginal costs for paid content. In addition to the need
to authenticate with a password, users at this institution need to either: a)
pay the $7.00 per article fee and enter their credit card information; or b)
arrange for the request to be handled via the institution’s inter-library loan
department. In either case, the costs of access was higher than password
only, and, as we expect, the rate of paid access was lower than that of the
Red group.
Table 3 summarizes the results from the estimation of the eﬀects of user
cost on access. We controlled for diﬀerences in the graduate students/faculty
ratio and percentage of users in Engineering, Science and Medicine. The
dependent variable, Paid Accesses per 100 Unmetered Accesses, controls for
9Only 28% of unmetered accesses from Red group users were password authenticated.
This suggests that a large majority of users attempting to access paid content would not
already be password authenticated. For these users, the need to password authenticate
would truly be a marginal cost.
10No month Month
dummies dummies
Dependent variable is weekly normalized paid access per 100 free access
Constant 87.535* 108.615*
10.394 14.643
Blue: Credit Card (Inst. 15) -280.490* -270.879*
(37.627) (35.508)
Red + Inst.14 -58.999* -57.764*
(7.900) (7.186)
Out of Tokens -25.070* -25.665*
(1.635) (2.533)
Graduate Students/Faculty Ratio 43.821* 41.748*
(7.301) (6.912)
Percentage Engineering, Science and Medicine -225.913* -215.767*
(7.535) (36.553)
Sample Size 530 530
R2 0.171 0..229
Standard errors are shown in parenthesis.
* Signiﬁcant at the 99% level, ** Signiﬁcant at the 95% level; *** Signiﬁcant at the 90% level.
Table 3: Estimation Results on Eﬀects of User Cost on Access
learning and seasonality eﬀects. We thus see the extent to which paid access,
starting from a baseline of access to paid content without marginal cost, falls
as we increase marginal costs. Imposition of a password requirement reduces
paid accesses by almost 60 accesses per 100 unmetered accesses, while the
depletion of tokens at these institutions results in a further reduction of
approximately 25 access.
We gain further evidence of the extent to which the marginal costs asso-
ciated with paid access throttles demand for metered access by comparing
the composition of unmetered access with the composition of metered access.
First, We calculated the ratio of free accesses to articles inside the institu-
tions Traditional Subscription base to those outside. We would expect that,
absent any additional user costs, this ratio would be the same for metered
content. Based on this ratio and the number of articles accessed under an
institution’s Traditional Subscriptions, we can predict the number of paid
accesses that would have occurred if there were no additional marginal costs
for paid access.
Table 4 presents actual paid access as a percentage of predicted for all
institutions that had Traditional Subscriptions in a given year. The only
true outlier is institution 10. We suspect that this might be partially due
to the fact that they had the fewest Traditional Subscriptions. As relatively
little was available at zero user cost, it is likely that a user at this institution
11Institution Year Actual Per Percent Free Access Credit Card Password Entered
Predicted Psswd. Authent. Required When Prompted
3 1998 21.14% 11.10% 0 6.69%
10 1998 146.15% 45.35% 0 13.54%
11 1998 16.39% 8.81% 0 2.64%
12 1998 83.33% 51.71% 0 7.14%
13 1998 125.93% 98.75% 0 100.00%
14 1998 79.25% 54.50% 0 44.44%
15 1998 0.00% 22.19% 1 8.06%
3 1999 31.38% 19.06% 0 10.44%
10 1999 123.40% 43.88% 0 13.43%
11 1999 20.82% 18.50% 0 14.12%
13 1999 77.67% 100.00% 0 100.00%
14 1999 56.69% 63.22% 0 17.78%
15 1999 19.52% 12.21% 1 2.39%
Table 4: Paid Access as Percentage of Predicated Based on Free Access
Composition
accessed PEAK expecting to have to pay the password entry cost. We further
note that the percentage of free content accessed by password-authenticated
users is relatively high in comparison with other Red group institutions. As
for institution 13, recall that users faced no marginal cost to access paid
materials. We thus expect their paid access to be close to predicted. For all
other institutions we generally see that the costs associated with paid access
caused an appreciable reduction in the number of paid articles demanded.
We also present in Table 4 factors which we believe help explain this shortfall,
namely the percentage of free access that is password authenticated, whether
or not a credit card is required for all paid access, and the rate at which
passwords were entered for paid access when prompted.
Table 5 summarizes the results from the estimation of the eﬀects of user
cost on actual paid access as a percentage of prediction. Despite the small
sample size, the results clearly demonstrate that as we increase the number
of individuals who can access paid content without additional marginal costs
(proxied by the percent of free access that is password authenticated), more
paid access is demanded. The credit card required dummy is not signiﬁcant,
although it must be noted that there are only two observations where credit
cards are required, and both are the same institution. The coeﬃcient for the
percent of prompted users who login is of the wrong sign.
12Dependent variable is Actual paid access as a percentage of predicted.
Percent Free Psswd. Auth. 2.122*
(.446)
Prompted Login Percent -1.051**
(.544)




Standard errors are shown in parenthesis.
* Signiﬁcant at the 99% level; ** Signiﬁcant at the 95% level;
*** Signiﬁcant at the 90% level
Table 5: Estimation Results on Eﬀects of User Cost on Actual Paid as Percent
of Predicted
4.2 Eﬀects of User Cost on Access: Per Article Fee
If an institution did not have any tokens, either through depletion or unavail-
ability, a user wanting to view a paid article not previously accessed would
have had 3 choices.10 First, she could pay $7.00 in order to view the arti-
cle, and also incur the non-pecuniary cost of entering credit card information
and waiting for veriﬁcation. If the institution subscribed to the print journal,
she could substitute the print journal article for the electronic product. She
could also request the article through a traditional interlibrary loan, which
also involves higher non-price costs (from ﬁlling out the request form and
waiting for the article to be delivered) than spending a token.11
Due to the system design, we are unable to determine the exact number
of times that users were faced with the decision of whether or not to enter
credit card information in order to access a requested article. We were able to
identify in the transaction logs events consistent with the credit card decision.
These events are, however, a noisy signal for the actual number of times users
faced this decision.12
10Recall that all users at an institution could access, without password authentication,
any article previously purchased by that institution with a Generalized Token. For articles
purchase on a Per Article basis, only the individual who purchased the article could view
it without further monetary cost.
11The libraries at institutions 3 and 11 processed these requests electronically, through
PEAK, while the library at institution 9 did not and thus incurred greater processing
delays.
12This noisiness is demonstrated by the fact that the transaction logs contain events
13Estimated
Institution Credit Card Credit Card Percent
Requests Payments
3 53 13 25.53%
6 260 194 74.62%
9 190 1 0.53%
11 562 61 10.85%
15 137 73 53.28%
Table 6: Actual Credit Card Payments as a Percent of Requests as Estimated
from Transaction Logs
From this noisy signal, we were able to estimate the number of times
credit card payment was requested. For every month, we determined the
number of consistent events, and divided this number by the number of access
requests handled by the system for that institution. For each institution that
depleted its supply of tokens, we can thus calculate a weighted average level
of noise per access request for months in which they had tokens. We assume
that anything over this average in months without tokens would represent
requests for credit card payment. For institutions that never had tokens, we
use as a baseline the weighted average of events per access request recorded
by institutions with tokens.
In Table 6 we present the total number of payments as a percent of es-
timated requests for credit card payments. While the numbers of requests
for credit card payments should be regarded as only an estimate, the relative
percentages are consistent with our intuition. Institutions 6 and 15 never
had any tokens. We would thus expect that users at these institutions had a
relatively high expected cost of accessing articles and would thus pay fairly
frequently.13 Among the institutions where tokens were depleted, the pay-
ment rate is appreciably higher at institutions 3 and 11, which is consistent
with the fact that interlibrary loan requests were handled through PEAK.
We gain further understanding of the degree to which diﬀerences in user
cost aﬀects the demand for paid article access by looking at only those insti-
tutions that depleted their supply of tokens at various points throughout the
project. There were three institutions in this category: institution 3 ran out
of tokens in November 1998 and again in July 1999; institution 11 in May
consistent with a request for credit card for months in which institutions still had tokens.
13In addition, institution 6 is a corporate institution. It is possible that their users’
budgetary constraints were not as binding as those associated with academic institutions.
14Institution Credit Card Credit Card Percent
Requests Payments
3 128 13 10.16%
9 366 1 0.27%
11 1128 61 5.41%
Table 7: Actual Credit Card Payments as a Percent of Requests as Estimated
from Token Expenditure Rate
1999; and institution 9 in June 1999.
For those institutions which had tokens available at certain times, we can
estimate the number of credit card requests based on the number of tokens
spent per free access. If we make the assumption that this rate of token
expenditure would have remained constant were tokens still available, we
can estimate the number of credit card requests to be equal to the estimated
number of tokens that would have been spent were tokens available.
Table 7 presents the rate of credit card payments as estimated from the
rate of token expenditure. The relative percentages are consistent with our
previous estimates for these institutions. These estimates of requests for
credit card payment suggest that our previous estimates were about 50% too
low.
Institution 3 Institution 3 Institution 9 Institution 11
1998 1999 1999 1999
30 days prior 13.56 18.43 20.2 16.03
30 days after 0.25 0.29 0.00 0.35
Percentage Decrease -98.16% -98.43% -100.00% -97.82%
Units: Normalized paid access per 100 unmetered accesses.
Table 8: Eﬀect of Token Depletion on Demand for Paid Content
To further quantify the decrease in demand for paid access resulting from
a depletion of tokens, in Table 8 we present the normalized paid accesses
per hundred free accesses at these institutions for the 30 days prior and
subsequent to running out of tokens. The results further demonstrate that
when users are faced with increased user costs for electronic access, demand
for these articles plummets.
The results that we have presented in this section show, unsurprisingly,
that increases in user costs substantially diminish demand for paid content.
What is more interesting is that the decisions made by thousands of users
15demonstrate that non-pecuniary costs, such as password use, have an impact
on demand that is of the same order of magnitude as direct monetary costs.
5 Eﬀects of Expected User Cost on Access
As demonstrated in Table 2, there is great variation in the demand for paid
content, measured by Normalized Paid Access, even amongst institutions
with similar user cost proﬁles. This statistic controls for number of Tradi-
tional Subscriptions, institution size, and seasonality. As previously noted,
it is quite possible that we have not suﬃciently controlled for the eﬀects of
the size of Traditional Subscription base.
The more journals to which an institution subscribes, the more content
that users at an institution accessed at zero marginal cost. The frequency
with which users are asked to pay for content will aﬀect a user’s ex ante
estimation of how much she will need to pay. This eﬀect on her estimate can
stem from either her previous direct experience, or through “word of mouth”
learning. It is our hypothesis that free access aﬀected users’ expectations of
the cost of access, and that this impacted the probability that a user pays
for access when requested.
We have two hypotheses as to why this happens. Our ﬁrst hypothesis is
that an increase in expected costs causes a selection bias. As we increase the
expected cost to access an article, some users will opt to not attempt to access
the information via PEAK. Users whose expected valuation of an article is
low, or for whom paying the cost is onerous, will not use PEAK to obtain the
article. This means that those who do use PEAK, and are confronted with
the need to pay for access, are more likely to do so. Our second hypothesis
is that context of the request for payment matters, i.e. there is a “framing”
eﬀect. It is possible that if a user is habituated to receiving something for
free, he will be resistant to paying for that object, even if his valuation is
greater than the cost. Unfortunately, the data that we have does not permit
us to distinguish between these two scenarios.
In Table 9 we present some evidence that users’ expectations do matter.
The institutions included are all of the institutions where password entry
was required in order to spend a Generalized Subscription token, plus insti-
tution 14, where users faced similar costs. In the third column we present
the percent of unmetered content that was selected from journals in an insti-
tution’s Traditional Subscription base. Assuming that there is no qualitative
16Normalized Paid Accesses Percent of Unmetered Percent who Login
Institution Per 100 Unmetered in Subscription Base when requested
3 13.50 83.62% 8.38%
10 31.69 6.94% 13.47%
11 7.59 74.21% 2.64 %
12 26.44 11.05% 7.14%
14 15.06 31.41% 29.63%
Correlation Coeﬃcients:
Paid Access and % of Unmetered in Subscription Base: -0.87
Prompted Login and % of Unmetered in Subscription in Base: -0.36
Table 9: Eﬀect of Subscription Coverage on Paid Access
diﬀerence in the types of articles requested (metered versus unmetered) from
journals in or out of an institution’s subscription base, this should give a
strong indication of the expected costs faced by users. For example, most of
the articles requested by institution 3 were accessed at zero marginal cost.
It is thus not unlikely that most users did not expect to have to enter a
password. In the adjoining columns, we present measures of the willingness
to pay. In the ﬁnal column, we present the percent of users who login when
prompted in order to spend a token, while in the second column we present
each institution’s Normalized Paid Access.
The data does not contradict the idea that users who expect to get their
requested article at no cost will be less likely to bear the non-pecuniary cost
of password retrieval and entry than those whose expectation of getting the
article for free is less strong. We see that the more that users get for free,
the less their demand for free articles as summarized by Normalized Paid
Access. Furthermore, we see a negative correlation, although not as strong,
between getting articles at zero marginal cost and entering a password when
requested.
6 Actual versus Optimal Choice
In determining to which scholarly print journals to subscribe, librarians are in
an unenviable position.14 They must determine which journals best match
the needs and interests of their community subject to two important con-
straints. Their ﬁrst constraint is budgetary. This constraint has become
14For an excellent discussion of the collection development oﬃcer’s problem, see Haar
[1]
17increasingly binding of late, as renewal costs have tended to rise faster than
serial budgets [1]. The second constraint is that libraries have incomplete
information in terms of community needs. At the heart of this problem
is the fact that a traditional print subscription forces libraries to purchase
publisher-selected bundles of information (the journal), while users are in-
terested primarily in the articles therein. Users only read a small fraction
of articles,15 and the library generally lacks information about which articles
their community values. Further compounding their information problem is
the fact that a library must make an ex ante (before publication) decision
about the value of a bundle, while the actual value is realized ex post.
The electronic access products oﬀered by PEAK enabled libraries to mit-
igate these constraints. First, users had access even to those articles included
in the journals to which the institution does not subscribe. (At institutions
which purchased Traditional Subscriptions, 37% of the most accessed ar-
ticles in 1998 were outside the institution’s Traditional Subscription base.
This ﬁgure was 50% in 1999.) Second, the transaction logs that are feasi-
ble for electronic access allowed us to provide libraries with monthly reports
not only on which journals their community valued, but also which articles.
Detailed usage reporting should enable libraries to provide additional value
to their communities. They can better allocate their serials budgets to the
most valued journal titles or to other access products such as those oﬀered
by PEAK.
6.1 Optimal Choice: Aggregates
In order to estimate an upper bound on how much the libraries could beneﬁt
from better usage data, we analyzed each institution’s accesses to the PEAK
database in 1998 to determine what would have been their optimal bundle
for the year if they had been able to perfectly forecast which articles would
be accessed. We then calculated how much this bundle would have cost
the institution, and compared this optimal cost with the institution’s actual
expenditures.
We present these results by access product in Table 10, and by total
expenditures in Table 11. We found that actual expenditures were markedly
15The percentage of articles read through June 1999 for academic institutions partici-
pating in PEAK ranged from .12% to 6.40%. An empirical study by King and Griﬃths
[4] found that about 43.6% of users who read a journal read ﬁve or fewer articles from the
journal and 78% of the readers read 10 or fewer articles.
18Traditional Generalized Per Article
Instid Year Actual Optimal Actual Optimal Actual Optimal
3 1998 25,000 17,000 2,740 3,836 7 133
5 1998 N/A 0 15,344 6,576 0 169
6 1998 N/A 0 0 548 672 0
7 1998 N/A 0 24,660 12,604 0 0
8 1998 N/A 0 13,700 2,740 0 0
9 1998 0 556 13,700 6,576 0 56
10 1998 4,960 323 8,220 7,672 0 483
11 1998 70,056 5,217 2,192 13,700 0 84
12 1998 2,352 107 2,192 1,096 0 98
13 1998 28,504 139 N/A 0 952 1,120
14 1998 17,671 0 N/A 0 294 504
15 1998 18,476 0 N/A 0 0 1,176
3 1999 12,500 10,528 2,740 1096 84 0
5 1999 N/A 0 8,768 2,740 0 399
6 1999 N/A 0 0 548 686 0
7 1999 N/A 0 10,960 9864 0 511
8 1999 N/A 0 6,028 5480 0 462
9 1999 0 278 7,124 6,576 7 182
10 1999 2,480 1,401 8,768 6,576 0 210
11 1999 0 576 4,384 2,740 427 532
12 1999 0 0 1,644 548 0 539
13 1999 9,635 7,661 N/A 0 19964 7,175
14 1999 0 0 N/A 0 623 623
15 1999 8,992 1,058 N/A 0 511 1,694
Table 10: Actual versus Optimal Expenditures per Access Product for 1998-
1999
19Instid Year Actual Optimal Savings Percent
3 1998 27,747 20,969 6,778 24.43%
5 1998 15,344 6,745 8,599 56.04%
6 1998 672 548 124 18.45%
7 1998 24,660 12,604 12,056 48.89%
8 1998 13,700 2,740 10,960 80.00%
9 1998 13,700 7,188 6,512 47.53%
10 1998 13,180 8,478 4,701 35.67%
11 1998 72,248 19,001 53,247 73.70%
12 1998 4,544 1,301 3,243 71.37%
13 1998 29,456 1,259 28,197 95.73%
14 1998 17,965 504 17,461 97.19%
15 1998 18,476 1,176 17,300 93.63%
3 1999 15,324 11,624 3,699 24.14%
5 1999 8,708 3,139 8,708 63.96%
6 1999 686 548 138 20.12%
7 1999 10,960 10,375 585 5.34%
8 1999 6,028 5,942 86 1.43%
9 1999 7,131 7,036 94 1.33%
10 1999 11,247 8,187 3,060 27.21%
11 1999 4,559 3,848 711 15.60%
12 1999 1,644 1,087 557 33.88%
13 1999 29,599 14,836 14,763 49.88%
14 1999 623 623 0 0%
15 1999 9,502 2,751 6,751 71.04%
Table 11: Total Actual versus Optimal Expenditures for 1998-1999
20higher than optimal purchases in 1998. In particular, institutions in the Red
and Blue groups purchased far too many Traditional Subscriptions. Further,
most institutions purchased too many Generalized Subscriptions. We believe
that much of the over-budgeting can be explained by a few factors:
• First, institutions greatly overestimated demand for access, particularly
with respect to journals for which they purchased Traditional subscrip-
tions. This diﬃculty in forecasting demands was compounded by delays
some institutions faced in implementing the project and communicat-
ing with their users. In particular, none of the institutions in the Blue
Group started the project until the third quarter of the year.
• Second, aspects of institutional behavior, such as “use it or lose it”
budgeting and a preference for non-variable expenditures, might have
factored into the decision making. A preference for non-variable expen-
ditures, ﬁxed in advance, would induce a library to rely more heavily
on Traditional and Generalized subscriptions, and less on reimbursed
individual article purchases or interlibrary loan.16 This explanation,
however, is somewhat contradicted by Kantor et. al. (2001) [3], who
report that libraries dislike bundles as they force libraries to make ex-
penditures for low value items.
• Third, because they cost less per article, but allow ex post article se-
lection just like per-article purchase, Generalized Subscriptions provide
an insurance function to cover unanticipated demand. If libraries are
risk-averse (in this case to the risk of large per-article purchases) they
might be willing to pay an “insurance premium” to reduce the risk by
buying more Generalized Subscription tokens than are expected to be
used.
The PEAK project team provided the participating institutions with reg-
ular reports detailing user access to journals and articles. We hypothesized
that librarian decisions about purchasing access products for 1999 might be
consistent with a simple learning dynamic: increase expenditures on prod-
ucts they under-bought in 1998 and decreasing expenditures on products
16With print publications and some electronic products libraries may be willing to spend
more on full journal subscriptions to create complete archival collections. All access to
PEAK materials ended in August 1999, however, so archival value should not have played
a role in decision making.
21Traditional Generalized
Optimal Actual Optimal Actual
Instid Direction Direction Direction Direction
3 - = + +
5 N/A N/A - -
6 N/A N/A + =
7 N/A N/A - -
8 N/A N/A - -
9 + = - -
10 - = - +
11 - - + +
12 - - - +
13 - = N/A N/A
14 - = N/A N/A
15 - + N/A N/A
Table 12: 1999 Expenditures: Actual Increase/Decrease versus. Predicted
Optimal Cost
they over-bought in 1998. To see the extent to which institutions used this
information in determining expenditures, we took for each institution the
change in expenditure from 1998 to 1999 for each access product,17 and com-
pared this change with the change recommended by the learning dynamic.
We present the results in Table 12.
Six of the nine institutions adjusted the number of Generalized Subscrip-
tions in a manner consistent with what we predicted.18 This adjustment of
expenditures has not taken eﬀect to the same degree for Traditional Subscrip-
tions. Seven of the eight institutions bought more Traditional Subscriptions
than optimal in 1998, yet only two of the seven responded by decreasing the
number bought in 1999. Further, only three of the eight institutions made
any changes at all to their Traditional Subscription lineup. This suggests an
inertia that cannot be explained solely by direct costs to the institution, but
perhaps can be partially explained by looking at total costs. As it is less
costly for users to access articles included in Traditional Subscriptions (due
to the fact that passwords are not required), perhaps libraries want to ensure
access to certain journals at the least possible user cost. It may also be that
17As 1999 PEAK access is for 8 months, the number of 1999 Generalized Subscriptions
was multiplied by 1.5 for comparison with 1998.
18One of the institutions that increased token purchases despite over purchasing in 1998
was more foresightful than our simple learning model: its usage increased so much that
it whose ran out of tokens less than six months into the ﬁnal eight-month period of the
experiment.
22the traditional emphasis on building complete archival collections for core
journal titles carried over into electronic access decision making even though
PEAK oﬀered no long-term archival access.











No constant term is included in the regressions.
Standard errors are shown in parenthesis.
* Signiﬁcant at the 99% level, ** Signiﬁcant at the 95% level;
Table 13: Estimation Results on Forecast Error
In Table 13 we report the results from the estimation of the forecast
error after controlling for diﬀerences in the experimental groups. From the
Year 1999 dummy variable we can see that institutions did a better job of
forecasting their optimal bundle in 1999. We also considered other control
variables, such as the institution’s level of expenditures, fraction of the year
participating in the experiment and number of potential users, but their
contribution to explaining the forecast error was not statistically signiﬁcant.
6.2 Optimal Choice: Speciﬁc Choices
In addition to comparing the total number of subscriptions for an institution
with the optimal number, we can also identify the optimality of individual
subscriptions. In particular, we can assess how many of the optimal number
of subscriptions an institution actually held. Further, we can identify how
many of an institutions subscriptions were not optimal in the sense that ac-
cess would have been less expensive with via other available access products.
In Table 14 we present an analysis of the subscriptions selected by in-
stitutions. While we see a wide variation both in terms of the percent of
subscriptions that are optimal and the percent of optimal journals that the
institution does not subscribe, there is clearly opportunity for improvement.
23Instid Year Total Percent Percent of Optimal Percent of Subs
Subscriptions Optimal Not Subscribed To Accessed
3 1998 907 53.25% 3.40% 92.50%
10 1998 23 0.00% 100.00% 65.22%
11 1998 663 3.62% 0.00% 84.46%
12 1998 22 0.00% 100.00% 81.82%
13 1998 205 0.49% 0.00% 12.68%
14 1998 72 0.00% N/A 36.11%
15 1998 102 0.00% N/A 48.04%
3 1999 907 74.97% 7.73% 97.02%
10 1999 23 13.04% 76.92% 65.22%
13 1999 205 29.76% 62.58% 86.83%
14 1999 72 0.00% N/A 20.83%
15 1998 102 10.78% 8.33% 84.31%
Table 14: Optimality of Subscription Choices
We would expect to see better decisions as the institutions gained experience.
It is also surprising the rather large percentage of subscribed to journals which
were not accessed at all.
6.3 Dynamic Optimal Choice
We previously pointed out the fact that the access product purchasing de-
cisions made by institutions have a profound impact on the costs faced by
users, and thus the realized demand for access. Therefore, in deciding what
access products, electronic or otherwise, to purchase, an institution must not
only consider the demand realized for a particular level of user cost, but also
what would would be demanded at diﬀering levels of user costs. Likewise,
in our determination of the optimal bundle of access products, we should
not take the given set of accesses as exogenous. As a simple example, let us
assume that a subscription to a given journal requires 25 accesses in order to
pay for itself. Now assume that the institution in question did not subscribe
to that journal, and that 20 tokens were used to access articles in the time
period. At ﬁrst look, it appears as though the institutions did the optimal
thing. Let us assume, however, that we know that accesses increase by 50%
when no password is required. It now appears as though the institution
should have subscribed to that journal.
We do not, however, know by how much access have increased if no pass-
words or other costs were required. We do however, have estimates from
Table 4. In Table 15 we present the optimal bundles for selected institutions
24Instid Year Trad. Subscriptions Addit. Articles Increase Total
Actual Rescaled Actual Rescaled Optimal Access
Optimal Optimal Optimal Optimal Cost Increase
3 1998 500 556 1099 1130 9.39% 12.53%
3 1999 737 805 236 146 4.85% 7.46%
11 1998 24 31 2532 3019 21.11% 21.09%
12 1998 1 1 254 287 17.76% 13.67%
14 1999 0 0 168 249 48.21% 48.21%
15 1999 12 17 242 366 47.56% 60.36%
Table 15: Optimal Bundles With Barrier Free Access: Selected Institutions
after rescaling for barrier free access.19 For most institutions, the optimal
number of journals increases, as more journals pay for themselves. We es-
timate that in general, the cost of the optimal bundle would not increase
greatly if all access were at minimum user cost. In those cases where the
number of Traditional Subscriptions increase, the increase in optimal cost
is generally less than the increase in total accesses. Further, the greatest
increase occurs for the institution where tokens were not available and the
institution did not directly subsidize the per article fee, i.e. at those institu-
tions where users faced the highest user costs.
7 Conclusion
Recent disputes over the ownership of business processes determining the
number of “clicks” to buy a product bring to the forefront the importance of
user costs in e-commerce success. In the PEAK experiment, we have evidence
that for the information goods in question, these non-pecuniary costs are of
the same magnitude as signiﬁcant pecuniary costs. In a two-tiered decision
problem such as in this project, where intermediaries determine the user
costs required to access speciﬁc content, both the quantity and composition
of demand is greatly eﬀected by users reactions to these costs. Therefore any
determination of what the intermediary “ought” to do must take these eﬀects
into account. Furthermore, we have initial evidence that suggests that users
who come to expect information at zero marginal costs are far less likely
to pay these non-monetary costs when requested than their counterparts
who expect these costs. This ﬁnding is of great import to both those who
19Observations chosen had a well deﬁned scaling factor from Table 4 and had enough
article accesses to be meaningful.
25design electronic information delivery and pricing systems as well as any
intermediaries controlling information access and costs.
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